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BARGAINING WITH BAD GUYS: IS THE
GOVERNMENT BOUND TO FULFILL PROMISES
MADE TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF HOSTAGES?
David McCord *
I. INTRODUCTION
CUBAN INMATES IN LOUISIANA
FREE ALL 26 HOSTAGES
Oakdale, La., Nov. 29-Cuban inmates today released 26 hos-
tages they had held for eight days in the Federal detention center
here....
A few minutes after the hostages walked out of the facility
into the arms of their colleagues, a negotiator for the Government,
four detainees and three witnesses signed a formal settlement, end-
ing what was believed to be the second-longest prison siege in the
country's history.
Under the accord, the Government agreed not to rescind pa-
role decisions it had already made for Cuban detainees with fami-
lies or sponsors in this country. The Government also agreed, as it
had done before, to grant the detainees individual hearings ....
J.D. Williams, the chief Government negotiator, said there
would be no reprisals against the 1,000 detainees. He said they
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would be dispersed to 45 Federal penitentiaries around the coun-
try. The center, which was heavily damaged by fire during the
takeover, is to be rebuilt, Federal officials said.
"It's an excellent agreement on our behalf," said Mr. Wil-
liams, who is the regional director of the Federal Bureau of Pris-
ons. "We did not give away the store. It's an agreement we can all
live with."'
HOSTAGE INCIDENT AT SCHOOL ENDED
Police Overpower a Gunman Who Held Children
and Teachers in Alabama
Tuscaloosa, Ala., Feb 2 (AP) - A gunman who said he
wanted to help the homeless held dozens of children and teachers
hostage today before the authorities fooled him into giving up his
guns and then wrestled him to the ground, the officials said.
Twenty-six children and one teacher were freed unharmed
when the siege at the West End Christian School ended after al-
most 12 hours. Nearly 60 other hostages, including three other
teachers and an aide, had been released earlier in the day.
Police Chief Jerry Fuller identified the gunman as James L.
Harvey, 43 years old, a Tuscaloosa native who had been living in
San Antonio, Tex.
"Please Don't Hurt Me!"
Law-enforcement officers grabbed the gunman as he stepped
out of the school building after being led to believe he would re-
ceive a pardon and be allowed to hold a news conference. "Please
don't hurt me!" Mr. Harvey was heard to yell. "I've done every-
thing you asked."
As they put him in a squad car, the police officers told him he
would not be hurt.
While holding the hostages, Mr. Harvey said he was trying to
draw attention to the nation's homeless and hungry.
Al DuPont, the Mayor of Tuscaloosa, said Mr. Harvey was
shown a videotape made by Gov. Guy Hunt. Then, as part of an
agreement, Mr. Harvey turned over his weapons and began to lead
the child hostages outside for what he believed would be a news
conference. When he walked out the door, the police slammed it
shut behind him and wrestled him down. The last hostages left the
building a short time later.
Mr. Harvey had been armed with two pistols and a rifle, the
authorities said.




Governor Hunt issued a statement saying that in the video-
tape he had promised Mr. Harvey that he would be granted a par-
don and immunity, as Mr. Harvey had demanded. But the
Governor said the promise carried no legal weight.
"I'm just glad we were able to resolve it and none of those
children were hurt," Governor Hunt said in Montgomery, the state
capital.2
These two news items raise a fascinating but seldom examined
question of criminal law: when the government bargains with hos-
tage-takers, and makes promises of leniency in order to secure the
safety of the hostages, is the government bound to fulfill those
promises, or can the government, as Governor Hunt believes, disavow
the promises? The purpose of this Article is to examine that question
through an analysis of existing case law and public policy.
II. CASE LAW
The case law on this subject is sparse, consisting of four federal
cases, two of which are companion cases arising out of the same inci-
dent, and three state cases. The paucity of case law can probably be
explained in two ways. First, perhaps it does not often occur that the
government needs to make promises to secure the release of hostages.
Second, when the government does enter into such an agreement,
there is a substantial practical impetus for the government to comply
with the agreement in order to retain its bargaining credibility for
similar situations that may arise in the future. Whatever the explana-
tion, the case law in this country consists of only seven cases, which
will now be examined in chronological order.
The first two cases, United States v. Gorham 3 and United States
v. Bridgeman,4 arose out of an attempted jail break from the District
of Columbia jail in 1972. Prisoners Frank Gorham, James Bridgeman
and Robert Jones succeeded in having a loaded revolver smuggled to
2. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1988, at A13, col. 1. Harvey was indeed prosecuted in a state
criminal action. He filed an action in Alabama federal district court to obtain an injunction
against the state prosecution. The federal district judge granted the state's motion to dismiss
Harvey's federal complaint on the bases that the Governor had no authority to grant immunity
or a pardon, and that Harvey did not give valid consideration in that he was under a pre-
existing legal duty to release the hostages. Harvey v. Alabama, No. CV-88-P-0487W (N.D.
Ala. Apr. 1, 1988) (ruling from the bench). The authority question will be addressed in this
Article, see infra text accompanying notes 55-78, as will the pre-existing duty question, see
infra text accompanying notes 89-102.
3. 523 F.2d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
4. 523 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976).
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them. Jones then feigned an illness in his cell, and when two officers
entered to assist him, Jones and Gorham overpowered them and took
them hostage. The inmates then freed other prisoners in the jail and
along the way acquired five more jail personnel as hostages. Several
of the other freed inmates joined in the jailbreak attempt. The in-
mates requested to speak personally with District of Columbia Cor-
rections Director Kenneth Hardy. When Mr. Hardy entered the jail,
he was immediately seized as an additional hostage. Hardy, along
with the other hostages, was beaten and threatened over the course of
the next twelve hours. Eventually it became clear to the inmates that
they would not be allowed to succeed in their escape attempt. They
then turned their thoughts toward trying to get out of the predica-
ment with the least legal repercussions to themselves. Through physi-
cal abuse and threats, they induced Corrections Director Hardy to
sign a note drafted by the inmates which read as follows:
I, Kenneth Hardy, Director of the Department of Corrections of
the District of Columbia, hereby promise that there will be no re-
prisals of any kind, including no deadlock, nor will I bring any
court action against any of the inmates involved in the action that
has taken place on October 11, 1972 at the D.C. Jail. The inmates
will be continued in their present location pending any court
action.5
The inmates also took Hardy to the United States Courthouse and
obtained an order signed by a federal district judge stating that the
government would take no action against the inmates.
The inmates eventually surrendered. Numerous charges were
brought against them, and the trial judge severed the cases so that
three separate trials were held.6 In appeals from two of the trials,
defendants who were convicted argued that the note signed by Cor-
rections Director Hardy and the order signed by the district judge
granted them immunity from prosecution. The District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals decided those two appeals on the same day
in the companion cases of United States v. Gorham 7 and United States
v. Bridgeman.' Since the rationales of the two cases are identical, they
will be discussed together.
The defendants' argument was simple: we had a contract for
non-prosecution with the government, which the government
5. Gorham, 523 F.2d at 1094.
6. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d at 1106.
7. 523 F.2d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
8. 523 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
438 [Vol. 11:435
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breached by prosecuting us.9 As authority for this contractual mode
of analysis, the defendants cited Santobello v. New York,"° which had
held, using contractual language, that a plea-bargaining defendant
had a due process right to have the government live up to its side of
the bargain."1 Indeed, this contractual/due process argument based
on Santobello is the argument put forth by the defendants in the five
later cases as well.
12
The court disagreed with the defendants' contention that the
note and/or the order granted them immunity from prosecution. The
court found five reasons why the defendants were wrong. First, the
note by its own terms promised only that no administrative reprisals
would be taken and that Hardy would not personally institute any
lawsuits against the inmates, not that the government would not pros-
ecute the inmates."' Second, even had Hardy attempted to grant im-
munity, such an attempt would have been unavailing since the power
to grant immunity does not exist in the absence of a statute conferring
it, and there was no statute granting that authority to either Correc-
tions Director Hardy or a district judge in such circumstances. 4
Third, the alleged agreement was contrary to public policy and
nudum pactum.15 The court did not specify in what way such an
agreement was contrary to public policy. Fourth, the alleged agree-
ment was procured by duress and thus was voidable and had been
voided by the government.16 And fifth, even if the alleged agreement
had not been void as contrary to public policy and voidable as pro-
cured by duress, there was no consideration passing from the inmates
because they were under a pre-existing duty to obey the law, and per-
formance of a pre-existing duty does not constitute valid
consideration. 7
The next pertinent case, State v. Rollins,'8 also involved hostage-
taking by inmates. There, inmates in a Rhode Island correctional fa-
cility took a correctional officer as hostage and made a list of nine
9. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d at 1109-10.
10. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
11. Id. at 262.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 18-54.
13. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d at 1110.
14. Gorham, 523 F.2d at 1096-97; Bridgeman, 523 F.2d at 1110.
15. Gorham, 523 F.2d at 1097; Bridgeman, 523 F.2d at 1000. Nudum pactum is Latin for
a naked pact or bare agreement, Le., a promise made without consideration. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 961 (5th ed. 1979).
16. Gorham, 523 F.2d at 1097; Bridgeman, 523 F.2d at 1110.
17. Gorham, 523 F.2d at 1097; Bridgeman, 523 F.2d at 1110.
18. 116 R.I. 528, 539 A.2d 315 (1976).
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demands to the Director of the Department of Corrections. One of
the demands was that they not be prosecuted for their actions in tak-
ing the guard hostage. The Director of the Department of Correc-
tions agreed to this demand along with six others, after which the
inmates surrendered. 9 The inmates were prosecuted despite the
promise and were convicted. They contended on appeal that the
promise of immunity estopped the state from prosecuting them. The
court rejected this contention, citing three reasons. First, "[p]romises
extorted through violence and coercion are no promises at all; they
are void from the beginning and unenforceable as a matter of public
policy."20 Second, only the State Attorney General, not the Director
of the Department of Corrections, had authority to grant immunity. 2I
And third, combining the pre-existing legal duty and duress ratio-
nales, the court stated that "[w]e are dealing with coerced promises to
induce defendants to do what they were already legally required to
do.")
22
The next case, reported in 1979, again involved an inmate hos-
tage-taking situation. In United States v. West23 inmates took two
prison guards hostage and demanded a car to effect their escape.
Eventually realizing that they would not be allowed to escape, the
inmates began bargaining for amnesty. The associate warden agreed
to amnesty and safe conduct for all inmates involved if the inmates
freed the hostages unharmed. Finally the inmates freed the hostages
unharmed.24 The state then prosecuted the inmates for the insurrec-
tion. After referring to the conclusions of Gorham and Bridgeman
that such an agreement was voidable because of duress and a nudum
pactum contrary to public policy, 25 the court held that the associate
warden's agreement was unenforceable because it was induced by
duress.26
The 1983 case of United States v. McBride27 is the first reported
case involving a situation other than a prison insurrection, and the
only case of those to be discussed involving property being taken
"hostage." McBride involved an extortion attempt. In that case five
persons, including John McBride and his wife Jill Bird, planted five
19. Id. at 531-32, 359 A.2d at 317.
20. Id. at 533, 359 A.2d at 318.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 607 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1979).
24. Id. at 303.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 304.
27. 571 F. Supp. 596 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
[Vol. 11:435440
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bombs at the Gulf Chemical Company's Cedar Bayou Plant in Texas
and then sent a letter to Gulf demanding $15 million in return for
information concerning the locations and deactivation sequences for
the bombs. The letter also stated that the conspirators had planted
bombs at another Gulf Chemical facility, and that if Gulf did not
comply with the $15 million demand for Cedar Bayou, the conspira-
tors would demand $30 million for information concerning the loca-
tions and deactivation sequences of the bombs at the second,
unidentified facility. (Although bombs were in fact placed at the
Cedar Bayou plant, the conspirators decided that it was not necessary
to plant bombs at another location and that the mere threat of having
done so would be sufficient.) 28 Within a day of Gulf's receipt of the
letter, Gulf and the authorities had located and disarmed the five
bombs. However, the authorities were still concerned about the safety
of the facility in view of the fact that the extortion note said that in
excess of ten explosive charges had been planted at Cedar Bayou, and
more devices at the other, undisclosed facility.29
Within a week the authorities had captured all five of the con-
spirators. Upon his arrest, McBride offered to give the government
"everything it needed" in exchange for immunity for Bird.3" Believ-
ing that bombs might still be present on the premises and that they
might yet explode since the extortion note had stated that the bombs
could explode for some period after they had been planted, both the
United States Attorney's Offices in Colorado, where McBride and
Bird were arrested, and in the district in Texas where the bombs were
planted, agreed to the terms.31 McBride cooperated to the satisfac-
tion of the United States Attorney's Office in Colorado and the FBI,
and the United States Attorney's Office in Colorado dismissed the
complaint against Bird.32 The United States Attorney's Office in
Texas, however, decided to prosecute Bird. Bird moved to dismiss the
indictment on the ground that it violated the government's agreement
with McBride not to prosecute her.
The district court first considered the government's argument
that the alleged agreement was void due to the lack of consideration
in that McBride was merely fulfilling the pre-existing duty to refrain
from criminal activity in promising to locate and describe the explo-
sives. The court rejected the government's position, finding that Mc-
28. Id. at 600.
29. Id. at 599.
30. Id. at 601.
31. Id. at 602-03.
32. Id. at 604.
1988-89]
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Bride did do something that he had no pre-existing legal duty to do,
that is, he relinquished his rights under the fifth amendment and pro-
vided the government with incriminating evidence.33 Next, the court
examined the government's argument that enforcing the alleged
agreement would be contrary to public policy. Unlike previous
courts, which had not attempted to identify the public policy that
would be contravened, the court in McBride identified three public
policies that might be implicated. 4 First was the encouragement of
the disclosure of criminal activity. 35 As to this public policy, the
court found that the agreement in the case before it did not contra-
vene that policy; indeed it was entered into precisely in order to ob-
tain information about the criminal activity. 36 The court identified
two other public policies that could conceivably be implicated,
namely, the interest of the public that the government not be
blackmailed, 37 and the interest in not enforcing coerced adhesion con-
tracts.38 However, on the facts of the case before it the court found,
for reasons which it did not clearly articulate, that those public poli-
cies were not violated.39
The court then considered the government's duress argument.'
The court found a distinction between the facts here and the facts in
the prison uprising cases. In the prison uprising cases the purpose of
the threat to the hostages was to secure the immunity agreement. In
the case before it the threat to explode the bombs was not made in an
attempt to gain immunity, but rather to extort millions of dollars.
The court viewed McBride as being in a marginally better position
than the prison hostage-takers, because he did not threaten the gov-
ernment with the occurence of bad consequences that would not
otherwise occur if the government refused to accept his bargain.4"
Nonetheless, the court held that the continued existence of the threat
to the public safety engendered by the original threat was sufficient to
constitute duress on the government agents.42 The court then went
on to hold, however, that the United States Attorney's Office in Colo-
33. Id. at 605-06. The government made some other contract arguments based on the
peculiar facts of the case that do not warrant discussion.
34. Id. at 608.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 608, n.8.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 610.
41. Id. at 611.
42. Id. at 612.
[Vol. 11:435
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rado, by dismissing the complaint against Bird, had ratified the other-
wise unenforceable agreement.
43
That was not the end of the matter. The court found that con-
tract principles did not automatically control in a criminal case."
Rather, the court held that the application of the contract principles
to government agreements in criminal cases derives from the court's
supervisory responsibility for the administration of criminal justice,
and that those principles should not automatically be applied, but
rather should be applied only after giving due weight to counter-
vailing public policy considerations.45 On the facts of the case the
court found that public policy reasons against upholding the alleged
agreement far outweighed the interest of the defendant in having con-
tract principles applied:
[The Assistant United States Attorney's] action was obviously not
the calm exercise of discretion. The agreement, unlike agreements
in other cases, was entered under duress and consequently voida-
ble, and the court's concern therefore, is not, with protection of
defendant in the face of an overpowering government or with gov-
ernment misconduct but, to the contrary, for the public safety and
protection of a government of laws in the face of violence.46
Accordingly the court denied the motion by Bird to dismiss the in-
dictment against her.47
The 1985 case of State v. Sands48 again involved a hostage-tak-
ing, but not in a prison context. In that case, when police officers
sought to arrest Sands for assaulting his wife, he barricaded himself
into his house and took his four children hostage. Eventually the
county sheriff signed a document granting "immunity" to Sands for
all activities which had transpired up to that time. Sands finally sur-
rendered and was promptly prosecuted.49 After being convicted,
Sands argued on appeal that the prosecution was improper because
the sheriff had granted him immunity. The court summarily dis-
agreed on the basis that a contract induced by duress is
unenforceable.5"
43. Id. at 613.
44. Id. at 614 (citing Acosta v. Turner, 666 F.2d 949, 953 (5th Cir. 1982), and United
States v. Lieber, 473 F. Supp. 884, 891 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 618.
47. Id.
48. 145 Ariz. 269, 700 P.2d at 1372.
49. Id. at 272, 700 P.2d at 1372.
50. Id. at 275, 700 P.2d at 1375.
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The final case, Wagner v. State,5 decided in 1985, returns to the
context of hostage-taking by prison inmates. In that case, during ne-
gotiations to end a prison riot, the warden communicated a promise
of no reprisals against certain inmates, including Wagner, for the riot
situation. The promise specifically included that correction officials
would not bring any administrative or disciplinary proceedings or
sanctions against Wagner.52 After authorities quelled the riot, correc-
tion officials subjected Wagner to administrative proceedings and
sanctions as a result of his conduct. The most drastic consequence to
Wagner was forfeiture of 1,283 days of good time earned by him prior
to the riot.5 3 Wagner brought an application for post-conviction relief
challenging the forfeiture of his good time. One of his arguments was
that the agreement made by the warden was binding on the state. The
court concluded that any such agreement was contary to public policy
and void. The court said that while the executive department could
live up to the bargain for such reasons as it found valid, when it did
not do so the court would not uphold such an alleged agreement.54
III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. The Question of Authority
Before examining whether agreements like those in the previous
cases should be enforced under contract and public policy principles,
a preliminary question that arose in about half of those cases needs to
be examined; namely, what if the defendant seeking to uphold a grant
of immunity received that grant from someone who was not author-
ized by law to give it? The issue arose in Gorham " and Bridgeman 56
where the court held that under federal law immunity could be
granted only by a federal district court and only to a prospective wit-
ness, and thus the immunity granted by the Corrections Director and
the district judge was without authority and unenforceable." Like-
wise, in Rollins"8 the court held that under Rhode Island law only the
Attorney General could grant immunity, and thus the purported
grant of immunity by the Director of the Department of Corrections
51. 364 N.W.2d 246 (Iowa 1985).
52. Id. at 248.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 250-51.
55. 523 F.2d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
56. 523 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
57. Gorham, 523 F.2d at 1096-97; Bridgeman, 523 F.2d at 1110.




These holdings provide an easy resolution of such cases, but the
defense is not without a further line of argument. Under the law of at
least one federal circuit (the Eleventh),' ° and at least one state,6' there
exists the doctrine of "equitable immunity," the purpose of which is
to allow courts to enforce immunity agreements even where those
agreements were flawed because not entered into by the proper gov-
ernmental authority. The most prominent decision to embrace the
doctrine is Rowe v. Griffin,62 decided by the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit in 1982. There, Rowe, a paid FBI informant who
had infiltrated the Ku Klux Klan, witnessed a murder committed by
Klansmen during the Selma to Montgomery civil rights march in
1965. Rowe reported the crime immediately to the FBI and aided the
FBI in its investigation. After being assured of immunity from prose-
cution by the Attorney General of Alabama, Rowe testified against
the Klansmen, who were convicted. 63 Thirteen years later a state dis-
trict attorney in Alabama, upon learning the results of lie detector
tests of the two surviving convicted Klansmen, purportedly showing
that they were truthful when they stated that Rowe had committed
the murder, obtained a state indictment for murder against Rowe.
61
Rowe instituted an action in federal district court to secure an injunc-
tion against the state criminal proceeding. His major legal problem
was that, at the time of his agreement with the Alabama Attorney
General, no statute existed empowering the Attorney General to
grant immunity.65 Under the doctrine that a federal court can enjoin
a state prosecution taken in bad faith or for the purpose of harass-
ment, 66 the federal district court held that the promise to Rowe had to
be fulfilled. 67 The court embraced the doctrine of "equitable immu-
nity" which had been mentioned, but not used, in some earlier cases. 68
While recognizing that "the concept of equitable immunity is not well
defined,"' 69 the Eleventh Circuit on appeal also embraced the doctrine,
59. Id. at 533, 359 A.2d at 318.
60. Rowe v. Griffin, 676 F.2d 524 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
61. People v. Brunner, 32 Cal. App. 3d 908, 915, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501, 506 (1973).
62. 676 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1982).
63. Id. at 525.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 526.
66. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49-54 (1971).
67. 497 F. Supp. 610, 616 (M.D. Ala. 1980).
68. E.g., United States v. Beasley, 550 F.2d 261, 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938
(1977); United States v. Donahey, 529 F.2d 831, 832 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828
(1976); United States v. Mitchell, 384 F. Supp. 562, 563 (D.D.C. 1974).
69. 676 F.2d at 526 n.3.
1988-89] 445
UALR LAW JOURNAL
holding that immunity should be available under the equitable powers
of courts when three conditions are met: first, that an agreement was
made; second, that the defendant had performed his side; and third,
that the subsequent prosecution was directly related to offenses in
which the defendant, pursuant to the agreement, either assisted with
the investigation or testified for the government.70 The court went on
to provide a constitutional underpinning to its holding, analogizing to
Santobello,7" which had held that a defendant has a due process right
to enforcement of a plea agreement.72 The court held that this con-
tractual analysis applied equally well to promises of immunity from
prosecution.73 The court found that Rowe was entitled to complete
immunity from prosecution and permanently enjoined the state
proceeding.74
The defendants in Gorham,7 Bridgeman,76 and Rollins77 did not
argue the equitable immunity doctrine, undoubtedly because the doc-
trine had not yet been formulated in the mid-1970s when those cases
were decided. Would a court today, in a jurisdiction that accepts the
equitable immunity doctrine, apply it in a hostage-taking situation to
help a defendant avoid having the agreement invalidated because he
negotiated with the improper governmental authority? Although
there is no case law on the proposition, it seems likely that a court
would not elect to bail a defendant out of the authority problem by
utilizing the doctrine of equitable immunity. The concept of "equity"
is founded upon the concept of fairness, and it does not seem likely
that a court would ignore the unfairness of the defendant holding hos-
tages while negotiating the purported agreement. If ever a party in
court exhibited the proverbial "unclean hands," it would be such a
hostage-taker.
Apparently, then, a hostage-taker who wishes to conclude an
agreement of non-prosecution must take pains to make sure that the
agreement is concluded with the proper governmental authority.
Usually, of course, this rather arcane legal requirement will not be
known or intuitively obvious to the hostage-taker. Accordingly, the
chances of the hostage-taker obtaining approval from the proper au-
70. Id. at 527-28.
71. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
72. Id. at 262.
73. 676 F.2d at 528.
74. Id. at 529. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit granted Rowe transactional immunity,
whereas the district court had granted him only use immunity, 497 F. Supp. at 615-17.
75. 523 F.2d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
76. 523 F.2d 1099 (D. C. Cir. 1975).
77. 116 R.I. 528, 359 A.2d 315 (1976).
446 [Vol. 11:435
RELEASE OF HOSTAGES
thority are slim. In fact, it may be that in some jurisdictions there is
simply no authority available for granting immunity in those circum-
stances. For example, a hostage-taker negotiating with the federal
government probably cannot obtain immunity from any governmen-
tal official, since immunity is available pursuant to a statute which
permits only immunization of prospective witnesses, and only by a
federal district court.
78
B. The Defense Contractual Argument: Santobello
The argument offered by the defense in all of these cases is a
contractual one premised upon Santobello v. New York. 79 In Santo-
bello the prosecutor in a plea agreement agreed to make no recom-
mendation as to sentence. At Santobello's appearance for sentencing
many months later a new prosecutor recommended the maximum
sentence, which the court imposed. Santobello attempted unsuccess-
fully to withdraw his guilty plea. His conviction was affirmed by the
court of appeals. But the United States Supreme Court held that
Santobello was entitled to have the government comply with the
terms of the plea agreement it had entered into with him:
This phase of the process of criminal justice, and the adjudicative
element inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended by
safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the
circumstances. Those circumstances will vary, but a constant fac-
tor is that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise
or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of
the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.80
Although the Supreme Court did not mention the word "con-
tract," it did use words like "promise," "agreement," and "considera-
tion" that are part of the contractual lexicon. Thus, Santobello stands
for the proposition that an agreement between the government and an
accused should, at least to some extent, be governed by contract
principles.
The obvious way in which a hostage-taker who has secured an
agreement from the government in return for release of hostages seeks
to use Santobello is to argue that the hostage-taker had a contract
with the government with which the government is bound to comply.
Unfortunately for such defendants, having opted into the arena of
contract law, there are two doctrines of contract law that serve to
78. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1982).
79. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
80. Id. at 262.
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readily render such alleged contracts unenforceable. Prosecutors
have been quick to point out these doctrines to courts, and courts
have been eager to accept them. These two doctrines will now be
discussed.
C. The Prosecution's Contractual Responses
1. Duress
The most obvious contract doctrine which serves to render such
alleged contracts unenforceable is duress. "Duress" is defined in con-
tract law as "any wrongful act or threat which overcomes the free will
of a party."'" In determining whether a transaction may be avoided
for duress "the main inquiry is to ascertain what acts or threats are
branded as wrongful."' 82 And while there are some hazy areas con-
cerning what constitutes duress, it is crystal clear that "[v]iolence and
threats of violence are wrongful. '8 3 Thus, the threats of violence to
person or property, or of continuing to hold a person against that
person's will, involved in the seven reported cases undoubtedly consti-
tute duress. The contrast between the Santobello fact pattern and the
fact patterns in the hostage-taking cases is vivid and easily perceived.
As the Bridgeman court pointed out, Santobello involved "mutually
binding promises freely given in exchange for valid consideration,"84
while a bargain secured while holding hostages involves "the most
patent form of duress."85
An interesting feature of the duress doctrine, however, is that it
does not render the alleged agreement completely void, but simply
voidable at the election of the coerced party.86 The significance of this
distinction is that a contract which is merely voidable can be ratified
by the coerced party after the coercion is removed.87 The question of
ratification will be discussed in a later section of this article.8
2. Failure of Consideration/Pre-existing Duty
The second contract doctrine which operates to the detriment of
hostage-takers is the pre-existing duty rule. That rule states that
"[w]here a party does or promises to do what he is legally obligated to
81. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9-2, at 337 (3d ed. 1987).
82. Id. § 9-2, at 338.
83. Id. § 9-3, at 339.
84. 523 F.2d 1099, 1110 (1975).
85. Id.
86. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 81, § 9-8, at 349.
87. Id.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 103-14.
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do or promises to refrain from doing or refrains from [sic] doing what
he is not legally privileged to do he has not incurred detriment." 9
Refraining from harming hostages or promising to release hostages
from unwarranted restriction of their personal liberty clearly falls
within the ambit of the pre-existing duty rule. As Corbin states in his
treatise, "[f]orbearance to commit a tort or a crime is something that
is required of all by public law. Such forbearance is not a sufficient
consideration for a return promise." 90 In all of the cases but one that
have considered the pre-existing duty argument, the court has found
that what the hostage-takers promised to do was no more than what
they already had a pre-existing duty to do.
The one exception is McBride.9" While not disagreeing with the
principle that forbearance to commit a crime does not constitute suffi-
cient consideration, the court found that McBride had given the gov-
ernment more than simply a promise of forbearance from committing
a crime. Additionally, he had given up his fifth amendment right not
to incriminate himself when he had provided the government with
information concerning the location of the bombs.92
The court's holding that McBride provided information that he
was not required to provide, thus providing sufficient consideration to
support the agreement, is questionable, at least in retrospect, given the
United States Supreme Court decision a year later in New York v.
Quarles.93 In that case the Supreme Court held that there exists a
"public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings
be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence.
94
In Quarles the police apprehended a rape suspect in a supermarket.
Upon arresting the suspect an officer noticed that he was wearing an
empty holster. The officer asked the suspect where the gun was hid-
den, and the suspect responded by telling the officer where he had left
the gun. The suspect was then charged with illegally carrying a
weapon, and his statement concerning the location of the gun was
admitted against him, even though he had not been given Miranda
warnings at the time the statement was made. After noting that the
presence of a gun in a public area constituted a grave danger to the
89. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 81, § 4-9, at 204.
90. IA A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 189, at 173 (1963). See also 1 S. WILLIS-
TON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 132, at 562 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1957): "As everybody is
under legal duty not to commit a tort, returning property to its owner, or otherwise refraining
from a tort is not a sufficient consideration."
91. 571 F. Supp. 596 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
92. Id. at 605-06.
93. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
94. Id. at 655.
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public, 9" and noting that requiring the police to administer Miranda
warnings in such a circumstance could deter the suspect from provid-
ing information leading to the alleviation of this public danger,96 the
Court stated:
Officer Kraft needed an answer to his question not simply to
make his case against Quarles but to ensure that further danger to
the public did not result from the concealment of the gun in a pub-
lic area.
We conclude that the need for answers to questions in a situa-
tion posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the
prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination.97
While the exact parameters of the "public safety exception" are
unclear, it would seem that a situation such as in McBride, where
there existed a possibility of serious injury to property and persons
from bombs, would fall within that exception. Indeed, in a state case
anticipating the ruling in Quarles an Indiana court held that where a
suspect has been questioned before being given Miranda warnings
concerning the presence, location, and method of detonation of a
bomb planted by him, those statements were admissible as an excep-
tion in the Miranda rule.98 Analogously, prior to Quarles, California
courts had fashioned a more limited version of the "public safety ex-
ception" called the "rescue doctrine" exception.99 That doctrine held
that when the police interrogate a suspect for the paramount reason
that information is being sought to save a life, the interrogating of-
ficers are justified in not impeding the rescue efforts by informing the
defendant of his rights under Miranda, and the statements obtained
are nonetheless admissible.10 Under these holdings the statements by
McBride could have been used against him even if he had made them
before having been given his Miranda warnings.
Admittedly, holding that statements made by a suspect are ad-
missible into evidence even though the suspect was in custody and not
Mirandized is different from holding that the suspect had no right to
95. Id. at 657.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Cronk v. State, 443 N.E.2d 882, 884-87 (Ind. App. 1983).
99. People v. Willis, 104 Cal. App. 3d 433, 163 Cal. Rptr. 718, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 877
(1980); People v. Riddle, 83 Cal. App. 3d 563, 148 Cal. Rptr. 170, cert. denied, 440 U.S. 937
(1978); People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 398 P.2d 753, cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1009 (1965), overruled on other grounds in People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913 (1974); People v. Dean, 39 Cal. App. 3d 875, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1974).
100. People v. Dean, 39 Cal. App. 3d 875, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1974).
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withhold that information from investigating authorities if he had
elected to do so. Nonetheless, the holding of the "public safety excep-
tion" is that in certain exigent circumstances created by the suspect,
the suspect's fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself is not
entitled to full constitutional protection. Put differently, the suspect's
fifth amendment right is not "worth" as much in those circumstances.
But is it "worth" something? If so, giving it up could constitute con-
sideration for a contract; if not, it could not constitute consideration.
A commentator discussing the California "rescue doctrine" sug-
gests that a suspect does not have a right to withhold potentially life-
saving information from the authorities at all: "The rationale behind
the doctrine is that the interest in saving a human life is considered to
be outside of the parameters of the constitutional protection afforded
against self-incrimination."'' This position makes eminently good
sense. It does not comport with any rational vision of the value of the
privilege against self-incrimination to hold that a suspect can place
persons and property in jeopardy by means such as a bomb and then
sit silently in police custody while the bomb ticks away and explodes.
The suspect in such circumstances should be under a duty to disclose
the whereabouts of the bomb. If the suspect is under such a duty,
then by divulging the location of the bomb the suspect is not giving up
anything in addition to what is required by law to be given up. And if
the suspect is giving up nothing, then it is incorrect for a court to
hold, as did the McBride court, that giving up that information con-
stitutes sufficient consideration to support a contract. 102
101. Annotation, Concern for Possible Victim (Rescue Doctrine) as Justifying Violation of
Miranda Reguirements, 9 A.L.R.4th 596 (1981).
102. Yet there are some circumstances in which a suspect's providing of information which
he should be expected to provide can suffice to make an agreement that the suspect may en-
force against the government. An illustrative case is Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State
Prison, 545 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1976). There, Palermo was in jail for a crime and was a suspect
in another multi-million dollar jewel robbery. State prosecutors approached Palermo and be-
gan negotiating to try to get him to reveal the whereabouts of the jewelry. Palermo agreed to
help locate the jewelry in return for a promise of parole on the sentence for which he was
incarcerated. Palermo did lead the authorities to the jewelry, but the state reneged on its
promise to grant the parole. Palermo filed suit to enforce the bargain in federal court. The
Second Circuit upheld a trial court ruling granting Palermo's requested relief. The state ar-
gued that under the pre-existing duty rule, Palermo had no legal right to conceal and withhold
the stolen property and thus had given no consideration. Id. at 295. The court disagreed,
noting that it was the state, not Palermo, which had initiated the negotiations, and the state
had never expressed any dissatisfaction with what it had received through the bargain. Id.
The court distinguished Gorham as inapposite because there the bargain was "negotiated
under extreme duress." Id.
It is questionable whether Palermo did provide any information beyond what the law
required him to provide since he had a legal obligation not to withhold property from its true
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In summary, with respect to pre-existing duty, in most hostage-
taking situations when a hostage-taker promises to not harm victims
or to release them, that promise or even performance of the promise,
constitutes merely the performance of a pre-existing duty which does
not constitute consideration. Even where a suspect provides informa-
tion, thereby seemingly giving up the right not to incriminate himself,
the "public safety exception" rationale should lead to the conclusion
that the suspect had no right to withhold that information to begin
with, and thus, the suspect was not giving up anything of value consti-
tuting consideration. Finally, even if the "public safety exception"
does not serve to render the relinquishment of the right to self-incrim-
ination valueless, the pre-existing duty rationale for striking down
such agreements is superfluous anyway, since the duress doctrine
would strike down such agreements even if consideration were found.
The only possible difference between refusing to enforce the agree-
ment on a duress basis and a pre-existing duty basis is with respect to
the possibility of ratification, which will be discussed below.
D. The Question of Ratification
It is important for government representatives to recognize that
the behavior of the government after the release of the hostages may
be important due to the contract doctrine of ratification.
The doctrine of ratification is available to a person seeking to
enforce a contract when the other party claims to have entered into
the contract under duress. 103 It is standard contract doctrine that a
contract procured through duress is merely voidable and not com-
pletely void." The party who consented to the contract through co-
ercion is deemed to ratify the transaction if after the coercion is
removed he recognizes its validity by acting upon it, accepting benefits
under it, or failing to act to avoid it with reasonable promptness.10 5
Indeed, the government in the Cuban inmate hostage situation, out-
lined in the news report at the beginning of this Article, 0 6 has almost
assuredly lost any possible duress defense by virtue of its subsequent
owner. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. Yet the equities of the situation clearly
dictate that Palermo should prevail. Better bases for the decision would be due process of law,
or the courts' supervisory power over criminal proceedings to see that justice is done. See
McBride, 571 F. Supp. at 615, suggesting these bases for upholding seemingly flawed
agreements.
103. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 81, § 9-8, at 349.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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professions of satisfaction with the agreement and its actions taken in
compliance with the agreement.
The ratification argument is apparently not so easily available to
a defendant seeking to enforce a bargain in the face of the govern-
ment's invocation of the pre-existing duty rule. An agreement unac-
companied by consideration passing from one of the parties usually
produces no legal obligation,' °7 and "[a]n agreement which produces
no legal obligation is frequently called a 'void' contract."' 0 If the
agreement is "void" for lack of consideration, then it takes some con-
tractual sleight of hand to say that the agreement can be ratified, un-
less and until some consideration does pass, thereby creating a
contract susceptible of ratification.
Thus, while initially it seemingly makes no difference whether
the court holds the agreement unenforceable under the duress doc-
trine or the pre-existing duty doctrine, it may matter if there is a ques-
tion of the ratification. Indeed, in McBride 109 the court held that
consideration had passed so that the pre-existing duty doctrine would
not avail the government 0 and also held that the agreement was pro-
cured under duress."' It then proceeded to hold that the coerced
agreement had been ratified by the government.
1 2
It is important to remember, however, that the McBride court
did not end the analysis there but rather concluded that while strict
contract analysis would hold the government to the bargain, strict
contract analysis was not the last word with respect to agreements in
a criminal context." 3 The court then held that from a public policy
standpoint the ratified coerced agreement was unenforceable.'
E. Beyond Contractual Analysis: The Prosecution's Public
Policy Argument
Prosecutors in the cases that have been discussed almost uni-
formly argue that it would be contrary to public policy to enforce
such agreements. Courts faced with that argument invariably accept
it. Yet the "public policy" holdings of the courts are usually not well
articulated. In fact, the only court to attempt to state what public
107. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 81, § 4-1, at 186.
108. 1 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15, at 28 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1957).
109. 571 F. Supp. 596 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
110. Id. at 605-06.
111. Id. at 612.
112. Id. at 613.
113. Id. at 614.
114. Id. at 618.
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policies are implicated was the court in the McBride case. 1 5 To the
credit of the district judge in that case, he put his finger squarely on
the public policy that would be offended by the enforcement of such
agreements: for the court to enforce such agreements would be to
validate the rule of force over the rule of law. As stated by the court:
It is clear that an individual may not, by threatening innocent citi-
zens, extract a promise from that government and then use the
courts to immunize himself or anyone else from prosecution. In
the exercise of the court's supervision over the criminal justice sys-
tem, "[p]ublic confidence in the fair and honorable administration
of justice upon which ultimately depends the rule of law, is the
transcending value at stake." [citations omitted] To enforce the
agreement with McBride would effectively ratify the defendant's
illegal actions rather than uphold the rule of law.116
It is important to note that if the agreement is void as against
public policy, then ratification would not seem to be a danger to the
government, since there would be no agreement in the first instance
that could later be ratified.
Thus, the prosecution has not only some heavy contractual artil-
lery in its stockpile but also some heavy public policy artillery.
F. Beyond Contractual Analysis: A Possible Defense Argument
Faced with such heavy artillery, it is not surprising that defend-
ants have not prevailed in the cases under discussion. Yet there is one
argument that has not yet been attempted by defendants that may
hold some slight glimmer of hope. That argument is that the govern-
ment is held to higher standards of conduct than a private litigant,
and that while the duress and pre-existing duty doctrines would be
available to private litigants to avoid an agreement, they are not avail-
able to the government because the government is under a higher duty
to comply with agreements than are private parties. Behind this argu-
ment lies a somewhat metaphysical conception of the government as
the embodiment of purity, nobility, and transcendent justice. Such a
noble entity should not be allowed to resort to the defenses which
mere mortals use to attempt to "wriggle out" of contracts.
There is some scant authority for this view that the government
should be held to very lofty standards of conduct. Several decades
ago in the context of a federal prosecutor's misbehavior in closing
argument, the United States Supreme Court stated:
115. Id. at 608, 616-18.
116. Id. at 618.
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The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." 7
But while this principle is accepted with respect to a prosecutor's be-
havior in closing argument, and probably at the trial as a whole, only
once has it been suggested (and that only by a district court) that that
rationale extends to the government's decision to prosecute. In
United States v. Phillips 18 the government sought to have Phillips, a
national union officer, held in criminal contempt of a court order in
the Northern District of Illinois, even though the government had
assured a judge in the District of Columbia that it would not proceed
against national union officers in actions against local union affiliates
and officers. The judge in the Northen District of Illinois found this
course of conduct to be "fundamentally unfair.""' 9 In so finding he
stated: "In the court's view, the government must be held to a higher
standard of conduct than that applicable to a private litigant, espe-
cially in the context of a criminal or quasi-criminal prosecution."120
While this line of reasoning provides an argument, it provides no
compelling rationale forbidding the government to use the duress and
pre-existing duty doctrines. Those doctrines of contract law are to a
great extent based upon fairness and common sense, rationales to
which the government should be able to resort as easily as any of its
citizens.
And even if the argument that the government should be held to
a higher standard were sufficient to prohibit the government from us-
ing contract defenses, that would not automatically mean that an
agreement should be enforced. As has already been noted, the gov-
ernment has a public policy argument separate and apart from its
contractual arguments. And pitting the defendant's "government
held to a higher standard" argument against the prosecution's "rule
of law rather than rule of force" argument, it seems quite clear that
the government's public policy argument emerges as the victor.
IV. CONCLUSION
The contractual and public policy arguments decisively favor the
117. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
118. 527 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
119. Id. at 1363.
120. Id. at 1364 n.4.
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government in these hostage-taking situations. Indeed, the conclusion
that such agreements should not be enforceable against the govern-
ment is such a visceral, common sense feeling that in a sense search-
ing for technical legal doctrines to justify the result seems almost
superfluous. Virtually any person on the street could probably give
just about as good an answer to the question whether such an agree-
ment should be enforceable as a court can: "Are you kidding?!"
